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MULTISTAGE THREE-PERSON GAME WITH ARBITRATION
$\ \mathrm{D}$ $\#$ $($ MINORU SAKAGUCHI’ $)$
ABSTRACT. By introducing a specified definition of the equilibrium value of three-
pmn $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{w}\triangleright\ \mathrm{o}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}$ games, a multistage three-person gamewith arbitration is formulated
and solved. Random offers $\{X.\cdot\}_{=1}^{n}.\cdot$ are presented one by-0ne sequentially, and as each
offer $X$ comes up, each player chooses either to accept (A) or to reject (R) it, with
the aim of receiving the most favorable partition of the offer they can get. When
the phyaes’ choices are different, arbitration comes in and forces the “odd-man” (the
“even-men”) to receive $pX.\cdot$ ($p-X.\cdot/2$ each), where $0\leq p=1-\overline{p}\leq 1$ and the game
terminates. It is shown that, in the equilibrium, each player chooses $\mathrm{R}$ for small $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}:\mathrm{s}$
(A for large offers), and randomizes between $\mathrm{R}$ and A for other offers, if arbitration
favors the odd-man side, $\dot{l}.e$. $p\in(_{\Xi}^{1},1]$ (the even-men side, $\dot{\mathrm{L}}e$. $p\in[0,$ $\mathrm{B}$1) .)
1 Problem. Let Xi, i $=1,$ 2, . .. ’ n, be :.:. d. random variables each with uniform distri-
bution on [0, 1]. As each $X_{i}$ comes up, each player I, II and $\mathrm{r}\Pi$ must choose simultaneously
and independently of other players’ choices, either to accept (A) or to reject (R) it. If a1
players choose A they get $\frac{1}{3}X_{*}$. each, and the game terminates. If all players Choose R,
then $X_{}$ is rejected and the next $X_{\mathrm{i}+1}$ is presented and the game continues. If players’
choices are different, arbitration comes in and forces the uodd-man” (the “even-men”) to
get $pX\dot{.}$ ($p-X.\cdot/2$ each), where $0\leq p=1-\overline{p}\leq 1,$ and the game terminates. Arbitration
is fair if p $=\S 1,$ and favors the cxld-man (even-men) side, if p $>(<)_{5}^{1}$ . If all of the first
n-1 random variables are rejected, all players must accept the rith. Each player aims to
maximize the expected reward he can get, and the problem is to find a reasonable solution
to this three person $n$-stage game.
At each stage, each player must think about : (1) He wants to become the odd-man if
p $> \frac{1}{3}$ , and an even-man if p $<31,$ especially when he ffices large X.., and (2) Since each $X_{}$
is a random variable, he can expect a larger one may come up in the future.
Let $(v_{n},v_{\tau\iota},v_{n})$ be the eq.values for the game (c.f., the game is symmetric for the players).





where the payoff matrix $Vb(X)$ is such that
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$\mathrm{R}$ by A $\mathrm{b}$ I






$*$A by II $*$
by
$\mathrm{M}_{nA}(x)=\mathrm{R}$ by II $px$ , $*$ , $*$ $*$ , $x$ $*$
A by $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}$ $*$ , $*$ , $px$ 3, $x3$ , $x3$
( $*\mathrm{s}$ ands for $(\overline{p}/2)$ )
If $p=51,$ players will evidently coordinate to choose R-R-R repeatedly and switch to
A-A-A as soon as $X_{1}$. $\geq\mu_{n-:}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s},\cdot \mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}$ $\{\mu_{n}\}$ is the Moser’s sequence
$\mu_{n}=E(X\vee\mu_{n-1})=\frac{1}{2}(1+\mu_{\tau\iota-1}^{2})$ $(n \geq 1,\mu_{1}=\frac{1}{2})$ .
So, the CES (common eq.value) is $\frac{1}{8}\mu_{n}$ .
Therefore we are interested in solving the $n$-stage game for $p\neq\S 1.$
The game(1.1)-(1.2) is solved for $p\in(_{5}^{1},1]$ and $[0,1) 5$ in Sections 2 and 3, respectively.
We need a specified definition of the eq. $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ in the optimality equation, as in Assumption A
stated in Section 2, since the equilibrium is often undetermined in Nash theory of compet-
xtive games.
Two person best-choice games where arbitration comes in are investigated in Ref.[l, 3,
4]. The present paper is a direct extention to three person game from the two person game
version Ref. [4]. The game (1.1)-(1.2) reduces to Odd-Man-Wins if $p=1,$ and Odd-Man-
Out if $p=0,$ both of which are discussed in Ref.[5]. One of the fundamental and elaborate
literature in game theory (including cooperative theory of games) is Petrosjan and Zenkevicl;
[2]. There are a few mathematical literature which discuss three-person competitive games,
and two of which are Vorobjev [6] and Sakaguchi [5]. The present paper owes much on
Vorobjev’s work.









Note that $\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{n}A}(x)$ doesn’t involve $\mathrm{F}2$ . The game continutes to the next stage if and only if
R-R-R is chosen. As soon as some one among the players chooses $\mathrm{A}$, the game terminates.
Let $V(\mathrm{c})$ be CEV (common eq.value) of the one stage game
(2.5)
Then CEV of the $n$-stage game (2.1)-(2.2) is
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(2.6) $v_{n}=(\overline{p}/2)Ex+$ ($p$ - $\mathrm{p}/2|\mathrm{E}E[xV(c)|_{e=(a\mathrm{i}^{-}}$ lv. $-1-\overline{\mathrm{p}}\prime 2$) $/(\mathrm{p}-\overline{\mathrm{p}}/2)]$
As is wel known in the Nash theory of competitive games the equilibrium is often
undetermined, even in three-person tw0-choice games, which we investigate in the present
paper. We prepare the following assumption that is held throughout this paper.
Assumption A If the equilibrium consists of some corner and or edge and a unique inner
point, the latter is adopted for the equilibrium. If equilibrium consists of a single point,
either a corner or inner point, this is adopted for the equilibrium.
(2.7) $V(c)=\{$ $c(1, -c/3)/(\sqrt{1-c}+\sqrt{2/3})^{2}$ , if $c<1,$
if $\mathrm{c}\geq 1.$
$c=(2x^{-1}v-\overline{p})/(3p-1)$ , $1-c=2(p-x^{-1}v)/(3p-1)$ ,
1-c$\oint$3 $= \frac{2}{3}$ . $\frac{4p-1-x^{-1}v}{3p-1}$ , $\alpha_{0}=\frac{\sqrt{1-c}}{\sqrt{1-c}+\sqrt{2/3}}=\frac{\sqrt{px-v}}{\sqrt{px-v}+\sqrt{(p-1/3)x}}$,
and hence, by Lemma 1.1, we obtain
$V(\mathrm{c})|\mathrm{c}=(\mathrm{z}-1v-\overline{p}/2)f(\mathrm{p}-\overline{\mathrm{p}}/2)$
$=\{$










if $p^{-1}v_{n-1}<1$ ; and $lJ_{n}=\mathrm{L}_{n-1}$ , if $p^{-1}v_{n-1}>1.$
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Before we state Theorem 1, we give two more lemmas. Consider the function
(2.9) $T(v|p) \equiv\frac{\overline{p}}{4}+(\frac{5p-1}{4p^{2}})v^{2}+(\frac{3p-1}{6})\int_{\mathrm{p}^{-1}v}^{1}\frac{x\{(4p-1)x-v\}}{\{\sqrt{(p-1[3)x}+\sqrt{px-v}\}^{2}}dx$ .
for $0\leq v\leq p$ ; and $v$ , $ip\leq v\leq 1.$ $(*\iota 9_{\mathrm{w}}\not\subset$)
Theor $\mathrm{m}$ $1$ The soluti $m$ to the three-person game (1.1)-(1.2) for $31<p\leq 1$ , is as follows;
The CES in state $(n,x)$ is
Choose $\mathrm{R}$ , if $c$ $<p^{-1}v_{n-1}$ ,
Employ the $m\dot{l}oeed$ strategy $\langle\overline{\alpha}\mathrm{o}(x),\alpha \mathrm{o}(x))$ , where
$\alpha \mathrm{o}(x)=\frac{\sqrt{px-v_{n-1}}}{\sqrt{px-v_{n-1}}+\sqrt{(p-1/3)x}}$ , if $x>p^{-1}v_{n-1}$ .
The CEV $v_{n}$ satisfies the recursion
$v_{n}=T(v_{n-1})$ , $(n22,v_{1}= 1/6)$
where $T(v)=T(v|p)$ is $\dot{\varphi}ven$ by (2.8). And as $n$ $arrow\infty,v_{n}\uparrow v_{\infty}(\mathrm{p})\equiv\sup\{v\in(0,p)|T(v’|p)>$
$v’,\forall v’\in(0,v)\}$ , for $ip$ $\in(_{8}^{1},1]$ .




See Sakaguchi [5 ; Theorem 2], in which $v_{n}\uparrow v_{\infty}(1)\approx$ 0.2057 as $n\prec$ oo is proven.
For $p=5+01$, Eq.(2.9)\ gives $T(v| \frac{1}{3}+ 0)$ $=\mathrm{E}+5v$ an$132$ d $v_{n}= \frac{1}{6}+\frac{3}{2}v_{n-1}^{2}(n\geq 2,v_{1}=F)1$ ,
and it is easily shown that $v_{n} \uparrow\frac{1}{3}$ as $narrow\infty$ .
3 Solution to the Game where $0 \leq \mathrm{p}<\frac{1}{\mathrm{s}}$ . For $0 \leq p<\frac{1}{3}$ , we can rewrite (1.2) as






where $h$ is a given constant. Note that $\mathrm{M}_{nA}(x)$ doesn’t involve $n$ by the same reason as in
Section 2.
Let $W(h)$ be the CEV of the one- tage game
(3.5)
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Then the CEV of the $n$-stage game (3.1)-(3.2) is
(3. 6) $w_{n}=pEx+E[(1-3p)xW(h)|_{h=(ae^{-1}w_{n-1}-}$p)/(1-3p),
We refer to a result in Sakaguchi [5 ; Theorem 3].
Lemma 2.1 The solution to the th$oee$-person game (3.5) is as follows : For $h\leq 0,$ the
pure-strategy triple A-A-A is in eq. For $h>0,$ the $m\cdot.xed$-strategy triple $(\alpha 0,\alpha_{0},\alpha_{0})$, with




The function is increasing and convex-concave for $0<h<3,$ attains marirnurn $at/1=3,$
and decreasing and concave-convex for $h>3.$ The two points of infnlexionn are $h=5(19\pm$
$\frac{4\sqrt{5})(\approx 0.018,5.981).Computationgives}{h=01/31/212312\infty}$
$\underline{W(h)=01/33\sqrt{6}-7\approx 0.\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}85(\sqrt{3}-1)/2\approx 0.3660}$0.37393/8 18/491/3
Hereafter we sometimes write $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{U}_{n-1}$ simply by to, omitting the subscript.






Then the CEV of the $\mathrm{n}$-stage game is, by (3.6),
(3.8) $\mathit{0}_{n}$ $=$ $E[px +(1-3p)xW(h)|_{h=}(1-1w-\mathrm{p})/(1-3\mathrm{p})]$
$=$ $\frac{p}{2}+(1-3p)E[J(x,w)I(x<p^{-1}w)+\frac{x}{3}I(x>p^{-1_{\mathrm{t}}})]$
$=$ $\{$
$\frac{1}{6}-\frac{1-3p}{\Phi^{2}}w^{2}+(1-3p)\int_{0}^{\mathrm{p}^{-1}w}J(x,w)dx$, if $0\leq w\leq p,$
$\frac{p}{2}4$
$(1-3p) \int_{0}^{1}J$ (oe, $w$)$dx$ , if $p\leq w\leq 1,$




So $\mathrm{e}$ $.\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ at
Then $\mathrm{m}$ $2$ The solution to the three-person game (1.1)-(1.2), for $0\leq p<\S 1,$ is as follows;
The CES in state $(n, x)$ is
Employ the $m\dot{\iota}xed$-strategy triple $\langle$ $\mathrm{m}(x),\alpha \mathrm{o}(x)\}$ , with
$\alpha_{0}(x)=\frac{\sqrt{w_{n-1}-poe}}{\sqrt{w_{n-1}-px}+\sqrt{(1/3-p)x}}$, if $x<p^{-1}w_{n-1}$ , and
Choose $\mathrm{A}$ , if $x>p^{-1}w_{n-1}$
The CEV satisfies the recursion
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(3.9) $?\mathrm{J}\mathrm{y}_{n}=U(w_{\tau\iota-1})$ $(n\geq 2, w_{1}= 1/6)$
where $U(w)=U(w|p)$ is piven by the $\mathrm{r}.h.s$.of (3.8).











Th se are identical to the result in Sakaguchi $\beta$ ; Theorem 4]. Ebrthemore it is shown that
$w_{n}$ converges to
$w_{\infty}$ $\equiv\inf\{w\in(0,$ $\frac{1}{6}$ ) $|U(w’|0)<w’,\forall w’\in(w,$ $\mathrm{g}1)$ $\}$ \approx 0.1601.
For $p\simeq$ lf3 -0, Eq. (3.8) gives $U(w|_{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}}^{1}-0)=$ Bl and $w_{n}\overline{=}\epsilon 1$ ,Yn $\geq 1.$
Remark a The game (1.1)-(1.2) has qite different solutions for the two cases $\S 1<p\leq 1$
and $0\leq p<\epsilon 1,$ as observed in Theorems 1 and 2, although they seemingy look si milar in
(3.9).(3.8). $\mathrm{F}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\alpha \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}$the particular cases $p=\epsilon 1$ a 0 give somewhat abnonnal phase to
the solution of the problem, as is mentioned in Remarks 1 and 2.
Remark 4 Theorems 1 and 2 show that, in the equilibrium, each player chooses $\mathrm{R}$ for
small offers (A for large offers), and rarzdoize $\mathrm{R}$ and $\mathrm{A}$, for other $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}\epsilon \mathrm{r}\epsilon$ , if arbitration
favors the odd-man side (even-men side). This optimal behavior is almost the same as in
the tw0-player gme version investigated in $\mathrm{R}\epsilon \mathrm{f}.[4]$ .
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